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Closing
Keynote
Pleading, for the Future: Conversations
After Iqbal
Lee H. Rosenthal*
One of the themes at this Symposium has been the remarkable
volume and intensity of the response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 Some of the papers presented at this Symposium
present the view that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,2 as applied in
Iqbal, drastically altered the interpretation and application of the iconic
words of Rule 8(a). But that understanding is far from monolithic, in the
bench, the bar, or the academy. Some judges, lawyers, and scholars
question the extent to which the pleading standards have changed,
pointing out that Twombly and Iqbal are but the latest in a series of cases
interpreting Rule 8; reminding us that many of the basic premises of
* United States District Judge, Southern District of Texas. Judge Rosenthal served
as a member, then Chair, of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Civil Rules Committee"), and is currently Chair of the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Standing
Committee"). Andrea Kuperman, J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 2004, Judge
Rosenthal's Rules Law Clerk, assisted in writing these comments. The views expressed
in this article are entirely Judge Rosenthal's.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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Twombly and Iqbal-such as requiring more than a recitation of the
elements of the claim and not assuming the truth of conclusory
allegations in analyzing a motion to dismiss-have been commonly
applied in courts for years; and reminding us that Twombly denied
imposing a heightened or fact pleading standard and that Iqbal stated that
it was applying the Twombly standard.3  The common-law process has
continued; a body of appellate court cases has emerged interpreting
3. See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Even before
the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it was
likely that conclusory allegations of motive, without more, would not have been enough
to survive a motion to dismiss."); Harrison v. Downey Say. & Loan Assoc., F.A., No. 09-
CV-1391, 2009 WL 2524526, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14,2009) ("Even before Twombly, it
was improper for a court to assume that a plaintiff could prove facts it had not alleged, or
that a defendant had violated the law in ways that had not been alleged."); Soukup v.
Garvin, No. 09-cv-146-JL, 2009 WL 2461687, at *3 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2009) ("[E]ven
before Twombly and Iqbal, the court of appeals had repeatedly held that a complaint
needs more than 'bald assertions ... [or] unsubstantiated conclusions'; nor may a
plaintiff 'rest on subjective characterizations or conclusory descriptions of a general
scenario."'); Argeropoulos v. Exide Techs., No. 08-CV-3760(JS), 2009 WL 2132443, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 8, 2009) ("Even before Iqbal, the federal rules required a plaintiff to do
more than just plead 'labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action."' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) ("[T]he plausibility
standard of Twombly can be understood as equivalent to the traditional insistence that a
factual inference be reasonable."); id. at 481 (noting that reading Twombly to empower
"judges to refuse to believe factual allegations that they find implausible" should be
rejected, "not only because of its radical inconsistency with the entire structure of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Seventh Amendment, but also because the
Twombly opinion rather frankly and properly disowns any such approach."); id. at 483
("[N]o Justice interprets Twombly to empower a judge to disregard factual allegations
simply because the judge finds them implausible."); id. at 484 ("Courts have long held
that legal conclusions need not be accepted as true on 12(b)(6) motions, have long
insisted that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable factual inferences, and have long
treated 'legal conclusions,' 'unwarranted deductions,' 'unwarranted inferences,'
'unsupported conclusions,' and 'sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
allegations' as 'more or less synonymous' terms."); id at 498 ("The need to rely on
experience and common sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical-it is a staple of
inductive reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudication."); Adam
N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2010) (Jan. 20,
2010 draft) (noting that "the most significant pre-Twombly authorities on federal pleading
standard are still good law in the post-Iqbal era," and that "[a]lthough Twombly and Iqbal
recognize a judge's power to disregard 'conclusory' allegations at the pleadings phase,
this does not necessarily constitute a drastic shift from notice pleading."); Douglas G.
Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 1063, 1089-90, 1090 n.175, 1098
(2009) (noting that "the requirement that a plaintiff state more than mere conclusions"
"was a longstanding requirement under Rule 8 even before Twombly," and explaining
that in "overrul[ing] a heavily criticized and poorly worded formulation of the Rule 8(a)
standard in Conley [v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),] ... the [Twombly] Court was merely
enforcing the directive in the Federal Rules and ratifying the reality within the federal
courts, which had eschewed the hyper-literal reading of the Conley language").
1538 [Vol. 114:4
2010] PLEADING, FOR THE FUTURE: CONVERSATIONS AFTER IQBAL
Twombly and Iqbal.4  And since Iqbal, bills have been introduced in
Congress to address the pleading standard in the federal courts. 5
This is an important-indeed, necessary-national conversation we
are having. We are really continuing a very long conversation. One
commentator noted that the preeminent rulemaker, Judge Charles Clark,
stated in 1947:
[O]ne of the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems
which a legal system must face is a combination of a due regard for
the claims of substantial justice with a system of procedure rigid
enough to be workable. It is easy to favor one quality at the expense
of the other, with the result that either all system is lost, or there is so
elaborate and technical a system that the decision of cases turns
almost entirely upon the working of its rules and only occasionally
and incidentally upon the merits of the cases themselves. In view of
this dilemma, pleading at best must be and should be a compromise.
4. See, e.g., Laffey v. Plousis, No. 08-1936, 2010 WL 489473 (3d Cir. Feb. 12,
2010); Phillips v. Bell, No. 08-1420, 2010 WL 517629 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2010); Hayden
v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Rhodes v. Prince, No. 08-10794, 2010 WL
114203 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2010); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591
F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009); Waters
Edge Living LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., No. 08-16847, 2009 WL 4366031 (11th Cir. Dec.
3, 2009) (per curiam); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2009); Braden v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d
Cir. 2009); Floyd v. City of Kenner, La., 351 F. App'x 890 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig.),
583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380 (4th
Cir. 2009); McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521 (3d Cir. 2009); Brooks v. Ross,
578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (1 lth Cir. 2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 334 F. App'x 758 (7th
Cir. 2009); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009); Atherton v. D.C. Office
of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
5. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) ("A
court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A
court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a
determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the
plaintiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of
2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by an
Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes
effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under
the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957).").
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It is a compromise, however, which should be continually re-
examined in order that the proper balance may not be lost.6
This national conversation is welcome in important ways. Although
there have been frequent adjustments to the discovery rules to respond to
changes in the way litigation is conducted, including changes in 1983,
1991, 2000, and 2006, the pleading rules have remained substantively
unchanged since 1938. It is fitting that we reexamine whether we are
achieving the proper balance. And this conversation is even more fitting
now because it comes at a time when civil litigation has been recently
and significantly changed. There have, of course, been periods of great
change in the past that impacted civil litigation. The changes in the
1960s that created new causes of action and changed the meaning of
access to the courts was one such period. In the last ten years, the
changes in information technology have given us another period of
change that has affected almost every aspect of activity-business,
government, medicine, education, and industry, to name but a few-and
has altered litigation about those activities as well as how that litigation
is conducted. The fact of this national conversation about the entry point
into litigation, the pleading standard, is a very good thing. The passion
that reflects the conversation's importance and the recognition of the
need to emerge with the right balance and the right answers is a very
good thing. The involvement of the academy, Congress, the judiciary,
and the bar-these are all good.
There are really several conversations going on at once. It is useful
to identify the different conversations and how they interconnect.
1. The Conversation About What the Pleading Standard Should Be
Most of the discussion has not been about changing the words of
Rule 8.' Some of the proposals for a legislative response have focused
on going back to earlier case-law statements about the Rule 8 words as a
short-term measure while the Judicial Conference Rules Committees
engage in the lengthy, multistep Rules Enabling Act process to craft a
more lasting approach.8 Some proposals for long-term revisions through
the Rules Enabling Act to Rule 8(a) or Rule 12 have focused on
explicitly requiring limited and targeted court-supervised discovery
before a court can require a response to, or rule on, a motion to dismiss,
6. Hartnett, supra note 3, at 476 n.19 (quoting CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING vii-viii (2d ed. 1947)).
7. The discussion has similarly avoided proposals to abolish Rule 8 or Rules
12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(e). The need for a pleading filter, a standard that must be met
before a case can proceed, is widely recognized.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074.
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if the case is one in which the information necessary to plead more
precisely or fully is exclusively in the defendant's possession. This type
of proposal does not change the Rule 8 pleading standard, but could
affect the procedure for ruling on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in some
cases. Other proposals have examined adding to the list of claims
subject to heightened pleading under Rule 9. There is a wide recognition
that if the words of Rule 8 or Rule 12 are to be revised for the long run,
this requires careful and thorough study and a transparent, inclusive, and
lengthy discussion. The specific bills that have been introduced
recognize that the mechanism Congress itself created for the careful,
transparent, and inclusive process of amending the rules is the Rules
Enabling Act process. 9  The conversation about what the pleading
standard should be is a conversation about rulemaking as well as a
conversation about what the rules should say.
2. The Conversation About Rulemaking
The words of Rule 8 have not changed since 1938. That does not
mean they have not been examined by the rulemakers. The Procedures
for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on
Rules of Practice and Procedure require the Advisory Committees of the
Judicial Conference to "carry on 'a continuous study of the operation and
9. The Rules Enabling Act sets out the specific procedure for amending rules of
procedure and evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (giving the Supreme Court the "power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals"); id. § 2073 (requiring the Judicial Conference to prescribe procedures
for consideration of proposed rules; authorizing the Judicial Conference to establish
committees consisting of members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and
appellate judges, to assist with the rulemaking process; authorizing the Judicial
Conference to establish a standing committee to review proposals of other committees
and to make recommendations to the Judicial Conference; requiring that business
meetings of the committees be open to the public unless the committee openly finds that
it is in the public interest for the remainder of the meeting to be closed and states the
reason for closing; requiring each committee to keep minutes and make the minutes
available to the public; requiring advance notice to interested persons of any business
meetings of the committees; and requiring recommendations to be accompanied by a
proposed rule, an explanatory note, and a written report explaining the action, including
any minority or other separate views); id. § 2074(a) (requiring the Supreme Court to
transmit proposed rule amendments to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the
amendment is to become effective, and providing that the rule proposal will take effect
no earlier than December 1 of that year unless otherwise provided by law); see also U.S.
Courts, Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last
visited April 6, 2010) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Procedures] (describing
procedures for amending rules, and requiring: open meetings; publication and circulation
of proposals to the bench, the bar, and the public; a period of at least six months for
public comment on proposals; and public hearings).
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effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in
use.' .. .',0 As soon as Twombly was issued, the Civil Rules Committee
and the Standing Committee began what has turned into a long-term and
intensive study of pleading. The Committees are looking very hard at
whether Twombly and Iqbal have created problems for judges, lawyers,
or litigants, in the different kinds of cases that are in our federal courts.
Here is a brief description of some of what the Civil Rules Committee
and the Standing Committee did and are doing to understand the impact
of these Supreme Court cases on federal civil litigation:
1. The Committees have sought out people who have extensive and
varied experience with Twombly and Iqbal, from both the academy and
the bar, to share their insights. The presenters have included academics
such as Professor Stephen B. Burbank" and Professor Robert G. Bone,12
and practitioners such as Gregory P. Joseph (former chair of the
American Bar Association Section of Litigation and current president of
the American College of Trial Lawyers), Douglas Richards (who
litigated Twombly in the Supreme Court), and Joseph Garrison (president
of the National Employment Lawyers Association). The Standing
Committee and the Civil Rules Committee continue to reach out to
lawyers representing affected parties for their views on how the decisions
have actually affected their cases.
2. The Civil Rules Committee had prepared for its careful review a
memorandum that sets out many of the cases that examine and discuss
Twombly and Iqbal. This memo is available on the Rules Committee's
website.13  The memo focuses on describing what appellate courts are
telling the district courts about how to apply Twombly and Iqbal. The
appellate cases exemplify the common-law process of taking the words
of a Supreme Court case and creating a body of law that fleshes out,
10. Judicial Conference Procedures, supra note 9, pt. 1.
11. Professor Burbank has been actively involved in the debate about pleadings after
Twombly and Iqbal. See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank,
Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
"General Rules", 2009 Wis. L. REv. 535 (2009); "Has the Supreme Court Limited
Americans' Access to Courts?": Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
pdf/12-02-09%2OBurbank%2OTestimony.pdf.
12. Professor Bone has written articles discussing the impact of Twombly and Iqbal.
See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-41, 2009), available
at http://www.bu.edullaw/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BoneR090309
ashcroftREV.pdf; Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REv. 873 (2009).
13. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Civil Rules Committee and Standing
Rules Committee (Apr. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/lqbal%20memo_041 51 0.pdf.
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smooths out, and gives boundaries to their application. This case law
continues to develop, answering questions that Twombly and Iqbal could
not: How will this articulation of the pleading rules actually be applied
in different kinds of cases? What does the context-specific term
"plausibility" mean when it is applied to different contexts? A number
of appellate court cases have reversed district court dismissals and
emphasized that Twombly and Iqbal are to be applied with caution and
nuance. And the district courts continue to provide new examples that
appellate courts will use to amplify, clarify, and manage the articulation
we are here to discuss. Careful review of the case law is vital to
understanding how Twombly and Iqbal may have affected the standard
applied under Rule 8, whether problems have arisen in applying the
standard, and whether there are types of cases or litigants that are being
disadvantaged or treated unfairly. This case-law study is ongoing.
Updated versions of the memo will continue to be publicly available.
3. The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") is conducting a detailed and
thorough empirical analysis of the grants and denials of motions to
dismiss in the district courts, comparing pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal
periods, and comparing different types of cases. The study will involve
individual analysis of cases. As a result, this study will not only be able
to tell whether a case or claim or party was dismissed but also whether
the dismissal was with or without leave to amend. The cases are from
some of the busiest district courts in circuits across the country. The data
this FJC study will produce is vital to understanding the impact of
Twombly and Iqbal. The FJC study will be publicly available. Because
the FJC study will take some time, given its thoroughness, the Standing
Committee and the Civil Rules Committee asked the Administrative
Office for preliminary data comparing motions to dismiss pre-Twombly
and post-Iqbal. That data has significant limits. It does not, for example,
distinguish between dismissals with or without prejudice. The
preliminary data is just that, but the results so far are consistent with the
appellate cases insisting on a careful application of Twombly and Iqbal.
The more detailed data from the FJC will help us to understand fully the
impact of the cases.
4. The Rules Committees have not stopped with these steps. It is
also useful to try to determine whether people who would have filed a
civil case in federal court before Twombly or Iqbal are not doing so now,
and if there is a significant increase in the cost of bringing federal court
cases because of an increase in the filing of motions to dismiss. And it is
important to understand how courts are approaching motions to dismiss
in cases involving "information asymmetry," in which the defendant has
exclusive possession of information necessary to plead more fully. The
Rules Committees asked the FJC to reach out to the bar to ask some of
1543
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these questions. The FJC conducted a closed-case survey of lawyers
who had handled federal court cases that closed in the last quarter of
2008, asking about different aspects of the litigation. 14 The response
level was very high. The FJC's staff conducted follow-up interviews
with lawyers who responded to the surveys. "Most interviewees
indicated that they had not seen any impact of [Twombly and Iqbal] in
their practice."" Most plaintiffs' lawyers said they do not use bare-
bones notice pleading in their practice and that they already satisfy the
standards set out in Twombly and Iqbal.16 "Almost all [interviewees]
indicated that their practice is to plead enough facts to tell a coherent and
persuasive story."' 7 The FJC also worked with the American College of
Trial Lawyers, the American Bar Association Section of Litigation, and
the National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA"), to compile
the results of surveys of the members of each organization." The NELA
survey included specific questions about the impact of Twombly and
Iqbal on the interviewees' practices.' 9 The responses from the NELA
lawyers showed that of the 67.1% who had filed an employment
discrimination case in federal court after Twombly, 29.9% said there was
no impact on their cases and 70.1% said there was an effect; and of the
70.1%, 94.2% said that the effect was to include more factual allegations
in the complaint, and 74.6% had the impression that they were
responding to motions to dismiss that might not have been filed before
Twombly/Iqbal. 20 The more detailed FJC study will provide more
information. Interestingly, fewer than 15% of the NELA attorneys
responding selected any one of the following options: that they
conducted more factual investigation before filing a complaint than they
would have before Twombly/Iqbal, that they screened cases more
carefully than they did before Twombly/Iqbal, or that they raised
different claims than they did before Twombly/Iqbal.21 These surveys are
14. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION
COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/costcivl.pdf/$file/costcivl.pdf.
15. THOMAs E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS:




18. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY
SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf.
19. Id. at 11.
20. See id. at 11-12.
21. Id. at 12.
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far from the end of the story. There needs to be more investigation, and
there will be. But the results are consistent with the appellate case law
and with the preliminary data. Taken together, they underscore the
importance of understanding the effects of the Supreme Court decisions.
5. The Civil Rules Committee and the Standing Committee were
planning-even before Iqbal was decided-to step back and take a hard
look at civil litigation in the federal courts and to ask the bench and the
bar how well it is working and how it might be improved. The Civil
Rules Committee had decided to conduct a major conference and invite a
broad, representative group of lawyers, litigants, law professors, and
judges. Pleading was always an important aspect of this conference.
Since Iqbal, its importance has become even greater. A central part of
the May 2010 Conference is a panel on pleading moderated by Professor
Arthur Miller, with Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit (who wrote
the Second Circuit's panel opinion in Iqbal), Professor Adam Pritchard,
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Daniel Girard (a lawyer focusing on
plaintiffs' consumer, securities, and antitrust cases), Sheila Birnbaum (a
lawyer focusing on defense of product liability cases), and Jocelyn
Larkin (a public interest lawyer).22
Because pleading is only part of the intertwined structure of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 2010 Conference is also looking
hard at discovery, including e-discovery, judicial case management,
summary judgment, trials, and settlements. The Conference will rely
heavily on new empirical research and data to provide an accurate
picture of what is happening in federal courts, and will present the
practical insights of the bar. The research is being conducted by such
diverse groups as the FJC, the American Bar Association, the American
College of Trial Lawyers, the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System, RAND Corporation, Cornell University, and
others. We hope to obtain data about how much it actually costs to
respond to and engage in various litigation tasks, especially electronic
discovery. All these studies will give the Rules Committees much-
needed information on discovery costs and burdens, in more detail than
has previously been available. That in turn will be important to inform
decisions on how best to achieve the proportionality standard that has
been part of the discovery rules since 1983. It will also shed light on one
of the concerns expressed in both Twombly and Iqbal, that discovery
costs are excessive and cannot effectively be controlled by judges
managing cases. The 2010 Conference will present reactions to this data
from corporate general counsel, outside lawyers, lawyers representing
22. Agenda, 2010 Litigation Review Conference, http://www.uscourts.gov/Press
Releases/20 1 0/AgendaFor201 OCivilLitigationConference.pdf.
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the government, and lawyers representing public interest groups. The
Conference will also examine the experience from state courts that have
used different approaches ranging from fact pleading to limits on
discovery and on summary judgment motions. The Conference will also
examine proposals developed by bar associations to work toward
proportional discovery in different kinds of cases.
In short, the 2010 Conference will bring together previously
unavailable empirical data, examined by thoughtful academics, judges,
lawyers, and litigants from different perspectives and interests. The
results could be quite important, ranging from shaping the Civil Rules
Committee's agenda for some time, to providing best practices for
training judges and lawyers, to proposing larger changes that may require
legislation to implement. The Rules Committees expect to learn a great
deal.
In these different methods, the Rules Committees are gathering
information in a disciplined and thorough way. The Committees are
dedicated to taking a hard and transparent look at what the information
reveals. The information will be publicly available. It will let the Rules
Committees identify whether there are problems in the pleading standard
as it is now articulated. That understanding of what problems exist, and
what kinds of cases they affect and in what ways, is needed to craft the
right response. If the problem is that the courts are not providing a
means for discovery before ruling on motions to dismiss in cases of
information asymmetry, that may call for a rule approach that requires
such discovery, linked to Rule I1 (b)(3). If the problem is the application
of the standard in certain kinds of cases or to certain kinds of litigants,
that may call for a rule approach that is similar to Rule 9, using different
pleading standards for certain kinds of cases. Rules are always difficult
to draft. Rules about pleading are the hardest; no part of the rule book is
as fundamental or as delicate. Information, understanding, and wide
input from a variety of the people and entities the courts serve is needed
to do it right.
The conversation about the rulemaking process has been going on
for a long time; the Rules Enabling Act has been with us for 75 years.
Congress and the courts are committed to its basic framework, but that
requires an ongoing conversation about specific applications. We are in
the midst of such a conversation now. That conversation is very much
about the Committees' transparent, inclusive, and honest assessment of
what the studies and the case law show. If the Rules Committees
conclude that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions are unfair or unworkable,
or that there is an effect on particular categories or types of cases or
litigants, and that changes in the rules are appropriate, they will say so.
The Committees will recommend changes needed to address problems
1546 [Vol. 114:4
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that are found. And given the process and the careful basis that will be
established for making recommendations, the Committees' proposals
will be taken seriously by all the entities that are part of the Rules
Enabling Act process.
3. The Conversation About Judging
Some of the reaction to Twombly, and particularly to Iqbal, is hard
for me to read as a judge because it reveals a somewhat cynical view of
what judges do and how they do it. That view is that judges, either intent
on advancing a personal ideological agenda or helpless to prevent the
influence of that agenda, will use the Twombly and Iqbal decisions to
dismiss "disfavored" cases. Some of the discussion of Iqbal has focused
on the use of the words "judicial experience and common sense" in
describing how judges rule on motions to dismiss as reinforcing this
cynical view of judging. These are not new words: Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, to use just one example, states that privilege
determinations "shall be governed by the principle of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience."2 3 But it is interesting to reflect on whether it
would have changed the tone of some of the post-Iqbal conversations if
the words used had been the ones Justice Kennedy chose in Boumediene
v. Bush2 4 when he discussed the district court's ability to handle issues in
the habeas cases brought by Guantanamo detainees. In that case, Justice
Kennedy used the words "expertise" and "competence" to describe what
a district judge would rely on in handling the habeas cases.2 5 These
words describe how judges work in objective, not subjective terms.
These words describe the work of professionals. They convey the kinds
of constraints that judges operate under, internal and external, in deciding
cases, including motions to dismiss. These constraints are an essential
part of what conscientious judges do every day, in every court, in
discharging the oaths that every one of us took. These constraints are
reflected in many of the cases in which courts are carefully and narrowly
reading Twombly and Iqbal and are not applying them as any kind of
license to dismiss certain kinds of cases.
4. The Conversations Continue
What are all these conversations? They are about what the standard
for pleading should be in the future. They are about working to ensure
23. FED. R. EVID. 501.
24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
25. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276.
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that the pleading balance is right and is stated so that it can reliably and
consistently be rightly applied. They are also about pleading for a future
that includes an informed, transparent, inclusive, balanced, and
disinterested process for continuing to ensure that the rules are fair and
effective. That process has been the Rules Enabling Act and it has
worked well for 75 years. All these conversations are based on, and
support, the future of an independent judiciary working with the bar, the
academy, and Congress to ensure that the rules that let the civil justice
system work for all it serves continue to do just that.
